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Opium was known as the “plant of joy” in Sumeria in 4000 B.C.E.  It 
grew in ancient Egypt and Persia.  Homer wrote of opium in the 
Odyssey as bringing “forgetfulness of evil.”  Virgil mentioned it in the 
Aeneid.  Romans used it as medicine.  Chaucer and Shakespeare 
referred to opium, too.  By the 18th century opiates were in nearly 
every English medicine cabinet.  While many Europeans saw opium 
eating and smoking for recreational purposes as exotic Eastern 
customs, moral panics condemning such “dangerous drugs” are a 
peculiarly modern phenomenon (Berridge and Edwards 1987:xxii-xxv).
Howard Padwa’s Social Poison tells the intriguing tale of how opiates 
came to be defined as dangerous in 19th century Britain and France.  
For different reasons, both nations made opiates the “main target” of 
drug control policy.  Padwa focuses roughly on the century leading up 
to 1916, when both countries first enacted national anti-opium laws.  
This period provides an important window on drug politics because 
these laws, together with the first federal US drug law, the Harrison 
Narcotics Act of 1914, essentially established the modern drug 
prohibition regime.  Now that more and more cracks are appearing in 
that regime, it is an opportune moment to learn more about its pre-
history.   
Britain is often thought to be a model of relative “restraint, reason, and
compassion” (p.2) in drug control, for example, having allowed 
physicians to maintain addicts on opiates and remaining somewhat 
less punitive toward illicit drug users than the US and many other 
nations.  France, in contrast, held fast to harsher drug laws and was 
among the last modern nations to allow even methadone maintenance,
the most effective treatment for opiate addiction.  
Padwa’s account of this divergence cites first a demographic divide.  In
Britain, the number of addicts was declining in late 19th century and 
they were more often artisans or middle-class and thus suffered fewer 
adverse consequences and were better able to function as contributing
members of society.  In France, addicts were younger, more numerous,
more marginal, and thus thought to be “potentially socially disruptive.”
Such demographics are often crucial.  In 1900, when most U.S. opiate 
addicts were white, middle-class, middle-aged women, addiction was 
defined as a private medical issue.  When the user base shifted to 
include more African Americans and disaffiliated working-class men, 
addiction was re-defined as crime (Duster 1970; Musto 1973).   
Second, Padwa describes a “discursive divide” in how fears about 
opiates were expressed, two different genres of “anti-narcotic 
nationalism.”  The British worried that opiates would make workers 
apathetic and unproductive, destroying industriousness and self-
sufficiency, and thus running “counter to the capitalist ethos that 
helped define the British way of life” (p.6).  Moreover, opiates were 
associated with the Chinese and thus not in keeping with British 
notions of citizenship and identity.  The French thought opiates posed 
a different sort of threat to nation and identity.  They envisioned their 
society in more collective terms and their sense of citizenship entailed 
a variety of civic-mindedness that offered little room for opiates, which 
they imagined led to “unbridled individualism” (p.7).  In the French 
view, opiate users invariably prioritized their habits, rendering 
themselves unable to contribute to the common good and therefore 
bad citizens -- a construction that stuck in no small part because the 
French linked opiates with ethnic enemies, first Asians and then 
Germans.  
In both countries, representations of opium were colored by class and 
colonialism.  British author and proud opium eater Thomas De Quincy 
raved that opium could induce “transcendental subjectivity” among 
elite intellectuals capable of appreciating such altered states.  Lesser 
ethnics and the working class were a different story.  Other British 
writers worried that opium would spell trouble in the “smaller brains” 
of non-Europeans.  Captain Cook claimed that opium led the Malays to 
wanton violence.  Dickens worried about English women being 
“Orientalized” by opium.  “The confluence of imperialist facts” (the 
Opium Wars) “and stereotypical fictions” (the belief that “the Oriental 
character” sought “passivity”) constituted what Padwa calls a “Sino-
phobic undercurrent” in British culture.  This was linked, ironically, with
Chinese government assertions of sovereignty over the opium trade in 
China, assertions which British elites depicted as “affronts to British 
liberty and prosperity” (translation: against their economic interests).  
The French colonial regime in Indochina also grew and sold opium.  
The practice of smoking it spread to French sailors, who smuggled it to 
French ports like Marseille.  This association with the Asian other 
inscribed an alien label on opiates.  Moreover, opiates were widely 
depicted as eroding morale in the armed forces and thus as “a tool of 
treachery.”  In the 1907 “Ullmo Affair,” for example, a Jewish naval 
officer (a la Dreyfus) tried to blackmail the government, threatening to 
sell secret codes to Germany unless paid.  French newspapers reported
that he was under the spell of opium from his mistress, an addict.  This
was amplified into a national scandal that made clear the links 
between opium, selfishness, degradation, and bad citizenship.  Ullmo 
was convicted and sent into exile in front of a crowd of tens of 
thousands in a “nationalistic purification ritual” (p.83).  The Ullmo 
Affair confirmed anxieties about opium users in “a nation already rife 
with fears of degeneration and national decline following the Franco-
Prussian War and the Paris Commune” (p.84).  World War I soon 
provided the occasion for a tough new narcotics law in France.  Left 
and Right both claimed that drugs were part of a German plot whose 
objective was “extermination of the French” (p.128), with opiate users 
as well as dealers cast as agents of treason.  Under such 
circumstances, harsh solutions become thinkable.  
Notwithstanding the differences Padwa cites to explain the 19th and 
early 20th-century divergence between British and French opiate 
controls, his comparison also shows some striking parallels with drug 
scares in the U.S.  In one and often both countries there were, for 
example, claims that one taste leads to addiction; that addiction 
disables the brain’s moral capacities and transforms users into 
monsters; that use of a demon drug is “spreading across all classes, 
ethnicities, and neighborhoods” (p.121).  There were celebrity 
overdoses; mass media that spread salacious details and routinized 
caricature; black market profits that incentivized creative smuggling 
and organized crime.  And as with drug scares in the U.S. and 
elsewhere, all this led to new laws with an “abundance of police 
measures” and a “lack of health measures” -- each an increment of 
criminalization that fails, each failure eliciting politicians’ calls for 
harsher punishments in the utopian fantasy of achieving a drug-free 
society, each further entrenching punitive prohibition.  Plus ça change, 
plus c’est la même chose. 
Padwa’s delicious details about the British and French cases explain 
their divergence in drug policy, but their eventual convergence around 
punishment-based prohibition, which was soon adopted around the 
globe, also begs for explanation.  What is it about drugs that has led 
democracies and dictatorships alike to embrace the prohibitionist 
paradigm?  Is it fear of altered states?  Anxieties about losing the self 
to addiction?  Is it the allure of the state’s enhanced capacities for 
social control of the dangerous class du jour?
Padwa’s book does what all good comparative analysis does:  it invites 
a shift of gaze that affords us some distance, some perspective -- in 
this case on a legal-policy paradigm that has been naturalized.  Social 
Poison shows the cultural-historical specificity and the socially 
constructed character of drug laws that until recently took on the 
appearance of normal, even immutable policy responses to a terrible 
social problem.  After a century, that is now changing.  Into what 
remains to be seen. []
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